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Why	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  Really	  Agrees	  with	  Me	  
Louis	  Michael	  Seidman*	  
	  
I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Professor	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  for	  his	  intelligent	  and	  generous	  review	  of	  my	  book	  
and	  to	  the	  editors	  of	  the	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  for	  providing	  me	  with	  this	  opportunity	  to	  respond.	  	  	  	  If	  I	  
understand	  Waldron	  correctly,	  he	  is	  in	  general	  agreement	  with	  my	  critique	  of	  our	  constitutional	  practice	  
but	  purports	  to	  have	  serious	  reservations	  about	  my	  proposed	  solution	  and	  about	  how	  one	  might	  get	  to	  
the	  solution	  even	  if	  it	  were	  a	  desirable	  place	  to	  go.	  	  I	  have	  a	  few	  quibbles	  about	  Waldron’s	  description	  of	  
my	  project,	  which	  I	  detail	  in	  a	  footnote.1	  	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  reply	  is	  devoted	  to	  Sections	  II	  and	  III	  of	  his	  
review,	  which	  he	  labels	  “Normative	  Prescriptions”	  and	  “Constitutions	  in	  General.”	  	  I	  argue	  that,	  despite	  
what	  Waldron	  thinks,	  there	  is	  virtually	  no	  gap	  between	  our	  positions.	  
For	  expository	  reasons,	  I	  reverse	  the	  order	  in	  which	  he	  discusses	  these	  questions.	  
I.	  Constitutions	  in	  General	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  	   Carmack	  Waterhouse	  Professor	  of	  Constituitonal	  Law,	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center.	  
	  
1	  	   Waldron	  accuses	  me	  of	  inconsistency	  because	  I	  complain	  both	  that	  political	  actors	  manipulate	  
constitutional	  doctrine	  to	  reach	  results	  that	  they	  desire	  and	  that	  they	  too	  often	  unthinkingly	  defer	  to	  constitutional	  
settlements.	  	  See	  [cite	  to	  P.	  4	  of	  Waldron	  review].	  	  The	  two	  points	  are	  fully	  consistent	  because	  different	  parts	  of	  
the	  Constitution	  are,	  respectively,	  open	  textured	  and	  precise.	  	  Constitutional	  language	  that	  is	  open	  textured	  –	  for	  
example	  the	  equal	  protection	  and	  due	  process	  clauses	  of	  the	  fourteenth	  amendment	  –	  is	  often	  manipulated	  to	  
achieve	  political	  ends.	  	  Constitutional	  language	  that	  is	  precise	  –	  for	  example	  the	  provisions	  establishing	  the	  
Electoral	  College	  and	  representation	  in	  the	  Senate	  –is	  almost	  always	  treated	  as	  settling	  issues	  that	  should	  be	  
unsettled.	  
	  
	   Waldron	  claims	  that	  I	  am	  “really	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘philosophical	  anarchis[t]’”	  –	  that	  is,	  a	  person	  who	  rejects	  an	  
obligation	  to	  obey	  any	  sort	  of	  law.	  	  	  [Cite	  to	  P.	  19	  of	  Waldron	  review]	  	  But	  although	  I	  have	  some	  sympathy	  for	  
philosophical	  anarchism,	  See	  On	  Constitutional	  Disobedience	  at	  119	  (noting	  that	  “there	  is	  much	  to	  say	  in	  support”	  
of	  it)	  I	  have	  not	  taken	  a	  firm	  stand	  on	  the	  issue.	  See	  id.	  at	  121	  (noting	  that	  because	  communities	  must	  have	  law,	  it	  
makes	  some	  sense	  to	  obey	  the	  law	  and	  that	  transactional	  theories	  of	  political	  responsibility	  have	  some	  intuitive	  
appeal).	  	  For	  some	  further,	  inconclusive	  musings	  on	  the	  subject,	  see	  Louis	  Michael	  Seidman,	  Political	  and	  
Constitutional	  Obligation,	  93	  B.	  U.	  L.	  Rev.	  1257	  (2013).	  In	  my	  book,	  I	  argued	  that	  whatever	  one	  thinks	  about	  
general	  political	  obligation,	  there	  are	  sound	  reasons	  to	  reject	  constitutional	  obligation.	  See	  On	  Constitutional	  
Disobedience	  at	  120-­‐123.	  
2	  
	  
	   Relying	  upon	  the	  constitutional	  experiences	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  
new	  constitutions	  of	  countries	  like	  South	  Africa,	  Poland,	  and	  East	  Timor,	  Waldron	  doubts	  my	  claim	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  it	  gave	  up	  on	  constitutional	  obedience.2	  	  Perhaps	  I	  am	  not	  
understating	  the	  seriousness	  of	  Waldron’s	  objections,	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  mostly	  or	  entirely	  
attributable	  to	  confusion	  about	  exactly	  what	  my	  claim	  is	  –	  confusion	  that,	  no	  doubt,	  is	  the	  fault	  of	  my	  
bad	  writing	  rather	  than	  of	  his	  bad	  reading.	  
	   First,	  I	  should	  have	  made	  clearer	  that	  my	  book	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  a	  work	  of	  comparative	  or	  
general	  constitutional	  law.	  	  I	  make	  passing	  reference	  to	  the	  constitutional	  experiences	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,3	  but	  only	  to	  help	  refute	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  
necessarily	  collapse	  into	  chaos	  and	  tyranny	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  constitutional	  obedience.	  	  The	  principal	  
focus	  of	  my	  book	  is	  on	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  and	  on	  how	  it	  functions	  in	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  
America.	  	  
As	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  other	  work4	  but	  should	  have	  made	  clearer	  in	  this	  book,	  the	  worth	  of	  
constitutions	  and	  of	  constitutional	  law	  must	  be	  judged	  contextually.	  	  In	  some	  circumstances,	  
constitutions	  can	  end	  devastating	  conflict,	  promote	  deliberation,	  or	  help	  achieve	  national	  liberation.	  	  
When	  constitutions	  accomplish	  these	  goals,	  they	  should	  be	  celebrated	  rather	  than	  attacked.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  American	  Constitution	  as	  applied	  to	  our	  current	  situation	  accomplishes	  none	  of	  these	  
goals.	  	  If	  I	  were	  forced	  to	  generalize	  beyond	  the	  American	  Constitution	  itself,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  my	  
critique	  of	  constitutional	  obedience	  takes	  hold	  in	  a	  context	  where	  
• The	  constitution	  in	  question	  is	  very	  old;	  
• It	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  amend;	  
• It	  was	  the	  product	  of	  compromises	  over	  issues	  that	  are	  no	  longer	  politically	  salient;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	   [Cite	  to	  Waldron	  review	  at	  17-­‐20,	  22-­‐23].	  
	  
3	  	   On	  Constitutional	  Disobedience	  at	  18,	  115,	  126.	  
	  
4	  	   See	  Louis	  Michael	  Seidman,	  Acontextual	  Judicial	  Review,	  	  32	  CARD.	  L.	  REV.	  1143,	  1170	  (2011)	  (“In	  different	  
contexts,	  constitutionalism	  .	  .	  .	  will	  be	  a	  more	  or	  less	  worthy	  project”).	  
3	  
	  
• It	  has	  provisions	  that	  fit	  badly	  with	  contemporary	  politics	  and	  culture	  and	  that	  are	  seriously	  
unjust	  or	  otherwise	  problematic;	  
• It	  exacerbates	  ordinary	  political	  disputes	  by	  allowing	  people	  on	  all	  sides	  to	  accuse	  their	  
adversaries	  of	  constitutional	  disobedience	  when	  they	  disagree	  about	  matters	  of	  policy;	  	  
• It	  channels	  debate	  into	  deeply	  irrelevant	  argument	  about	  constitutional	  doctrine	  rather	  than	  
about	  the	  practical,	  moral,	  and	  political	  questions	  that	  should	  drive	  public	  policy;	  and	  
• The	  country	  in	  question	  already	  has	  in	  place	  well	  established	  customs,	  traditions,	  and	  ways	  of	  
doing	  things	  that	  will	  structure	  its	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  constitutional	  law.	  
	  
These	  are	  attributes	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  of	  the	  American	  Constitution.	  	  So	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  
they	  are	  not	  attributes	  of	  the	  constitutions	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Poland,	  or	  East	  Temor.	  
Second,	  Waldron	  disputes	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  New	  Zealand	  have	  functioned	  
successfully	  without	  written	  constitutions.	  	  	  On	  his	  account,	  these	  countries	  have	  “a	  lot	  of	  written	  
constitutional	  law.”5	  	  	  But	  this	  assertion,	  and	  the	  dispute	  between	  us	  that	  it	  gives	  rise	  to,	  rests	  entirely	  
on	  Waldron’s	  definition	  of	  “constitution.”	  	  On	  his	  account,	  a	  constitution	  is	  “just	  the	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  
principles	  that	  organize	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  that	  country’s	  political	  system,	  constitute	  and	  empower	  the	  
most	  important	  institutions,	  and	  structure	  what	  various	  government	  agencies	  may	  or	  may	  not	  do.”6	  	  
These	  norms,	  he	  claims,	  can	  be	  unwritten	  and	  can	  consist	  of	  no	  more	  than	  customary	  rules	  or	  
precedents	  or	  “scattered”	  legislative	  texts.	  
Definitions	  are	  conventional,	  so	  if	  Waldron	  wants	  to	  define	  “constitution”	  in	  this	  way,	  I	  have	  no	  
quarrel	  with	  him.	  	  Still,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  here.	  	  When	  the	  controversy	  over	  waterboarding	  began,	  
President	  Bush	  definitively	  asserted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  torture.7	  	  Having	  defined	  torture	  as	  
that	  which	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  do,	  it	  logically	  followed	  that	  the	  various	  practices	  the	  United	  
States	  engaged	  in	  were	  not	  torture.	  	  I	  fear	  that	  Waldron’s	  definition	  of	  “constitution”	  accomplishes	  an	  
analogous	  purpose.	  If	  one	  defines	  “constitution”	  to	  encompass	  all	  arrangements	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  	   [Cite	  to	  Waldron	  Review	  at	  17]	  
	  
6	  	   Id.	  at	  18.	  
	  
7	  	   See	  “Transcript:	  	  President	  Bush’s	  Speech	  on	  Terrorism,”	  	  N.Y.	  Times,	  9/6/06.	  
4	  
	  
insure	  state	  functioning	  and	  stability	  (something	  that	  Waldron’s	  definition	  comes	  close	  to	  doing),	  then	  it	  
logically	  follows	  that	  states	  cannot	  function	  or	  remain	  stable	  without	  constitutions.	  	  	  	  	  
In	  my	  book,	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  define	  the	  term	  this	  broadly.	  	  Instead,	  I	  wrote	  about	  the	  American	  
Constitution	  –	  	  a	  single,	  written	  document	  that	  is	  very	  old,	  that	  is	  formally	  and	  deeply	  entrenched	  
against	  change,	  and	  that	  is	  popularly	  treated	  as	  defining	  the	  polity.	  	  	  I	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  that	  we	  need	  
not	  fear	  the	  consequences	  of	  disobedience	  to	  the	  American	  Constitution	  precisely	  because	  we	  already	  
have	  in	  place	  a	  network	  of	  customs,	  rules,	  precedents,	  and	  legislative	  texts	  that	  would	  adequately	  
structure	  our	  politics	  if	  the	  American	  Constitution	  were	  disregarded.	  
Waldron	  can	  call	  this	  network	  a	  “constitution”	  if	  he	  likes,	  but	  his	  own	  argument	  shows	  why	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  this	  sort	  of	  informal	  “constitution”	  and	  the	  actual	  American	  
Constitution	  that	  I	  criticized.	  Informal	  constitutions	  may	  be	  politically	  entrenched,	  but	  they	  remain	  open	  
to	  change	  through	  ordinary	  processes	  when	  advocates	  persuade	  people	  that	  they	  are	  unjust,	  ineffective,	  
or	  outmoded.	  	  For	  example,	  as	  Waldron	  points	  out,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  has	  succeeded	  in	  very	  
substantially	  reforming	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.8	  	  In	  contrast,	  because	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  is	  
legally	  entrenched,	  reforming	  the	  United	  States	  Senate	  is	  a	  practical	  impossibility.	  
I	  think	  that	  Waldron	  agrees	  with	  me	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  informal	  “constitutions”	  that	  inhibit	  endless	  
fights	  about	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  necessary	  and	  important.	  	  I	  think	  he	  also	  agrees	  with	  me	  that	  the	  
United	  States	  Constitution,	  replete	  with	  evil	  and	  archaic	  provisions	  that	  as	  a	  practical	  matter	  are	  
unchangeable,	  produces	  serious	  pathologies.	  	  If	  we	  really	  do	  agree	  about	  both	  of	  these	  points,	  then	  I	  
am	  unsure	  what	  of	  consequence	  we	  disagree	  about.	  	  
II.	  Normative	  Prescriptions	  
Professor	  Waldron	  wishes	  that	  I	  had	  said	  more	  about	  how	  to	  achieve	  the	  changes	  that	  we	  both	  
seem	  to	  favor.	  	  I	  too	  wish	  that	  I	  had	  said	  more.	  	  I	  wish	  that	  I	  had	  more	  to	  say.	  	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  not	  churlish	  to	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  to	  Waldron	  Review	  at	  21]	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point	  out	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  how	  to	  get	  from	  here	  to	  there	  is	  also	  underdeveloped	  in	  Waldron’s	  
own	  work	  about	  judicial	  review.	  
In	  any	  event,	  I	  can	  say	  at	  least	  this	  much:	  	  The	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  not	  about	  to	  
announce	  that	  henceforth	  it	  will	  disobey	  constitutional	  commands,	  and	  Congress	  is	  not	  about	  to	  enact	  
legislation	  formally	  disavowing	  the	  Constitution.	  	  Moreover,	  here	  as	  elsewhere,	  unilateral	  disarmament	  
is	  a	  bad	  idea.	  	  It	  makes	  no	  sense	  for	  one	  side	  to	  forego	  constitutional	  argument	  while	  the	  other	  uses	  it	  to	  
its	  advantage.	  
If	  there	  is	  to	  be	  change,	  then,	  it	  must	  first	  be	  on	  the	  cultural	  level,	  and	  cultural	  change	  occurs	  
one	  conversation	  at	  a	  time.	  	  If	  there	  are	  to	  be	  conversations,	  though,	  the	  issue	  must	  first	  be	  salient,	  and	  
right	  now	  it	  is	  not.	  	  To	  claim	  that	  my	  book,	  read	  by	  a	  tiny	  number	  of	  people,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  whom	  
disagree	  with	  it,	  will	  make	  the	  issue	  salient	  would	  border	  on	  clinical	  narcissism.	  	  Putting	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  
table	  requires	  action	  by	  culturally	  significant	  figures.	  
Is	  it	  possible	  that	  there	  will	  be	  such	  action?	  	  Consider	  the	  following:	  	  During	  the	  recent	  
controversy	  over	  the	  debt	  ceiling,	  President	  Obama’s	  spokespeople	  stated	  repeatedly	  and	  forcefully	  that	  
he	  lacked	  the	  constitutional	  power	  to	  ignore	  the	  ceiling.9	  	  Some	  well-­‐known	  scholars	  disagreed	  and	  
advanced	  elaborate	  constitutional	  arguments	  explaining	  why	  the	  President	  had	  this	  authority.10	  	  
Significantly,	  however,	  other	  important	  figures	  argued	  that	  he	  should	  disobey	  the	  Constitution	  if	  doing	  
so	  was	  necessary	  to	  the	  country’s	  wellbeing.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Jackie	  Calmes,	  “Obama	  Will	  Not	  Unilaterally	  Raise	  Debt	  Limit,”	  N.Y.	  Times,	  10/3/13	  (quoting	  
Press	  Secretary	  Jay	  Carney);	  Jackie	  Calmes	  &	  Jeremy	  W.	  Peters,	  “Boehner	  Hews	  to	  Hard	  Line	  in	  Demanding	  
Concessions	  from	  Obama,”	  N.Y.	  Times,	  10/6/13	  (quoting	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Jacob	  Lew).	  
10	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  Neil	  H.	  Buchanan	  &	  Michael	  C.	  Dorf,	  How	  To	  Choose	  the	  Least	  Unconstitutional	  Option:	  	  Lessons	  
for	  the	  President	  (and	  Others)	  from	  the	  Debt	  Ceiling	  Standoff,	  112	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  1175	  (2012).	  
	  
11	  	   See	  Henry	  Aaron,	  “Our	  Outlaw	  President?	  Obama	  Should	  Ignore	  the	  Debt	  Ceiling,”	  N.Y.	  Times,	  9/29/13	  
(arguing	  that	  the	  President	  should	  ignore	  the	  debt	  ceiling	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  would	  violate	  the	  Constitution);	  	  cf.	  
Adam	  Lipkak,	  “Experts	  See	  Potential	  Ways	  Out	  for	  Obama	  in	  Debt	  Ceiling	  Maze,	  N.Y.Times,	  10/3/13	  (quoting	  law	  
professor	  Eric	  Posner	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  President	  has	  inherent	  emergency	  powers	  to	  act	  to	  save	  the	  country).	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Suppose	  that	  the	  Republicans	  had	  held	  their	  ground	  and	  that	  the	  American	  economy	  was	  
spiraling	  toward	  catastrophic	  collapse.	  	  It	  is	  deeply	  implausible	  that	  the	  President	  would	  have	  done	  
nothing	  to	  meet	  this	  crisis.	  	  I	  suppose	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  he	  would	  have	  disavowed	  his	  many	  earlier	  
statements	  that	  he	  lacked	  constitutional	  authority	  to	  act.	  	  But	  it	  is	  at	  least	  as	  plausible	  that	  he	  would	  
instead	  have	  announced	  that,	  like	  Jefferson	  and	  Lincoln	  before	  him,12	  he	  would	  not	  let	  constitutional	  
language	  obstruct	  measures	  that	  were	  necessary	  to	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  republic.	  
Had	  Obama	  said	  this,	  the	  issue	  of	  constitutional	  obedience	  would	  indeed	  have	  been	  salient.	  	  Of	  
course,	  he	  did	  not	  say	  it,	  and	  we	  have	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  whether	  he	  would	  have	  said	  it	  if	  push	  had	  
come	  to	  shove.	  	  Nor	  can	  we	  know	  whether	  future	  events	  will	  cause	  important	  figures	  to	  make	  similar	  
statements.	  	  We	  do	  know,	  however,	  that	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  people	  treat	  the	  Constitution	  as	  an	  
obstacle	  to	  get	  around	  rather	  than	  a	  guide	  to	  action.13	  	  Moreover,	  the	  deep	  reverence	  Americans	  
express	  for	  the	  Constitution	  in	  the	  abstract	  rests	  uneasily	  with	  an	  equally	  	  deep	  cynicism	  about	  its	  
concrete	  use	  in	  ordinary	  political	  debate.	  	  This	  situation	  is	  not	  stable	  and	  creates	  at	  least	  the	  possibility	  
of	  radical	  change.	  
Perhaps	  that	  change	  will	  never	  come.	  	  Still,	  	  	  even	  if	  complete	  disarmament	  proves	  impossible,	  
we	  might	  negotiate	  a	  less	  ambitious	  mutual	  arms	  reduction	  treaty.	  We	  might	  at	  least	  agree	  to	  stop	  
pretending	  that	  constitutional	  text	  unambiguously	  and	  finally	  resolves	  the	  disputes	  between	  us.	  	  We	  
might	  come	  to	  see	  that	  our	  fellow	  citizens	  who	  disagree	  with	  us	  about	  issues	  like	  gun	  control,	  abortion,	  
affirmative	  action,	  and	  the	  appropriate	  reach	  of	  government	  power	  are	  disavowing	  core	  tenets	  of	  our	  
political	  community.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
12	  	   See	  	  XII	  THE	  WRITINGS	  OF	  THOMAS	  JEFFERSON	  418-­‐20	  (1892-­‐97	  PAUL	  LEICESTER	  FORD,	  ED.)	  	   	  
(Jefferson	  defending	  constitutional	  violations	  during	  his	  administration);	  Special	  Session	  Message	  (July	  4,	  1861),	  in	  
7	  Compilation	  of	  the	  Messages	  and	  Papers	  of	  the	  Presidents	  3225	  (James	  D.	  Richardson	  ed.	  1897)	  (Lincoln	  
defending	  making	  additions	  to	  military	  without	  congressional	  approval	  “whether	  strictly	  legal	  or	  not.”)	  
13	  	   See	  Mark	  Tushnet,	  Constitutional	  Workarounds,	  	  87	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1499	  (2009).	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I	  am	  not	  certain,	  but	  I	  think	  that	  Professor	  Waldron	  agrees	  with	  me	  that	  if	  we	  could	  accomplish	  
even	  that	  much,	  our	  polity	  would	  be	  better	  off	  for	  it.	  
	  
